

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-01

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 IO-13 OMB-01 TRSE-00 MCT-01 DHA-02 SAJ-01

ACDA-07 /093 W

----- 024364

R 070616Z DEC 76

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3878

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

WFEMBASSY LONDON 0560

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

ANDMBASSY TEHRAN 1090

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1798

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, IZ

SUBJ: IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AND ADVOCACY OF THE REJECTION  
FRONT

1. SUMMARY: ISOLATED, HYPER-SUSPICIOUS, FRUSTRATED IN ACHIEVING  
THEIR PAN-ARAB SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONARY GOALS, DISTRACTED BY A  
DEVELOPING SECESSION CRISIS, AND BITTERLY DISAPPOINTED BY THE  
OUTCOME IN LEBANON, THE IRAQI REGIME IS NOW LICKING ITS WOUNDS  
AND REASSESSING ITS POLICIES. THE COUCOME COULD BE A MORE  
REALISTIC RECOGNITION OF IRAQ'S LIMITATION IN REMAKING THE  
MIDDLE EAST TO FIT ITS OWN IDEOLOGICAL IMAGE, OR IT COULD

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MARK A REVERSION TO A MORE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF TERRORISM

AND COVERT WARFARE TOWARDS ITS REAL OR IMAGINED ENEMIES. IF THE REGIME OPTS FOR THE LATTER COURSE, IT HAS A WILLING TOOL AT HAND IN THE PRESENCE OF ABU NIDAL AND HIS GROUP OF EXTREMIST PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS WHO IN THE PAST HAVE RECEIVED SHELTER, SUPPORT AND PERHAPS ACTIVE COOPERATION FROM THE GOI. END SUMMARY.

2. WHILE THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE, THAT THE GOI GAVE PASSIVE APPROVAL, IF NOT ACTIVE SUPPORT, TO ABU NIDAL'S RECENT TERRORIST OPERATIONS IN DAMASCUS AND AMMAN, THE REGIME ALSO HAS A GIXWING COMMITMENT TO ITS INTERNAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPEMENT AND HAS DEMONSTRATED A DESIRE TO REDUCE ISOLATION FROM THE OTHER ARAB AND THIRD-WORLD NATIONS. THESE OBJECTIVES ARE CLEARLY INCONSISTENT WITH A POLICY OF INCREASED TERRORISM AND COVERT WARFARE WHICH COULD BRING ON A POLITICAL, AND POSSIBLY A COMMERCIAL, QUARANTINE OF IRAQ BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

3. THE IRAQI REGIME STILL FOLLOWS A RIGID REJECTIONIST POLICY IN ITS PUBLIC POSTURE AML, FOR THAT MATTER, IN ITS MORE INFORMAL TALKS WITH VIITING VIP'S. ITS EFFORTS TO FORM A REJECTIONIST FRONT, HOWEVER, HAVE COME TO NOUGHT AS ITS ERSTWHILE PARTNERS, LIBYA, ALGERIA, AND THE PLO, HAVE, FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, PROVED TO BE LESS THAN STAUNCH ALLIES IN THE "REJECTIONIST" ENTERPRISE. AT THE RIYADH MINI-SUMMIT AND THE CAIRO SUMMIT CONFERENCE, IRAQ FOUND ITSELF COMPLETELY ISOLATED AS THE ONE AND ONLY DISSENTER TO THE EVOLVING TREND OF ARAB POLICY ON LEBANON AND, MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, TOWARDS ISRAEL.

4. THE RESULTING ANGER AND FRUSTRATION IN BAGHDAD HAS NO DOUBT INCREASED THE TEMPTATION TO STRIKE OUT WITH STEPPED UP TERRORISM AND COVERT OPERATIONS, UTILIZING DISSIDENT PALESTINIAN MILITANTS WHO ARE ALSO UNHAPPY WITH THE EVOLUTION IN PLO POLICY TOWARDS AN ACCOMMODATION WITH ISRAEL. THERE IS EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT SOME COUNTER TRENDS ARE AT WORK IN THE MINDS OF THE REGIME'S LEADERS. FOR INSTANCE, THE IRAQIS HAVE RE- FRAINED FROM ATTACKING PRESRDENT SADAT FOR HIS CURRENT PEACE OFFENSIVE AND EVEN WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO GIVE EGYPTIAN VICE PRESIDENT MUBARAK THE RED-CARPET TREATMENT DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BAGHDAD. ACCORDING TO THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR, SADDAM HUSSEIN LISTENED CAREFULLY TO MUBARAK'S EXPLANATION  
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OF WHY EGYPT IS ADVOCATING A RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA CON- FERENCE AND WAS NON-COMMITTAL IN REPLY. HE DID NOT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO BERATE MUBARAK FOR EGYPTIAN POLICY. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS REPORTEDLY ACCEPTED THE EGYPTIAN INVITATION TO RETURN THE VISIT AT SOME TIME EARLY NEXT YEAR.

5. THIS IS A HOPEFUL SIGN BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, IT DOES NOT NECESSARY MEAN THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE CHANGED THEIR REJECTIONIST

SPOTS. IT MAY ONLY MEAN THAT THEY ARE GIVING HIGHER PRIORITY TO THE SEARCH FOR ALLIES IN THEIR BITTER STRUGGLE WITH THE SYRIAN REGIME. THEIR ACUTE SENSE OF ISOLATION FOLLOWING THE CAIRO SUMMIT MAY HAVE MOTIVATED THEM TO SOFT-PEDAL THEIR POLICY DIFFERENCES WITH EGYPT IN THE HOPE OF PRESERVING A USEFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE OF THE MAJOR ARAB COUNTRIES.

6. ANOTHER FACTOR THAT TENDS TO INFLUENCE IRAQI FOREIGN-POLICY MAKING IS THE DIVISION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE NATIONAL COMMAND, DOMINATED BY MICHAEL AFLAK, AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND, DOMINATED BY HUSSEIN AND BAKR. WHILE THE REGIONAL COMMAND CLEARLY HAS THE FINAL SAY, AFLAK, AS THE IDEOLOGICAL FATHER-FIGURE OF THE BAATH PARTY, HAS ENOUGH INDEPENDENT STATURE TO INFLUENCE THE POLICY DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND. THE NATIONAL COMMAND, BY SPEAKING OUT IN ADVANCE OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND, PROBABLY FORCES THE REGIONAL COMMAND INTO MORE IDEOLOGICALLY REGID POLICIES THAN THEY WOULD OTHERWISE ADOPT. WHILE THE REGIONAL COMMAND HAS THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IRAQI POLICY, AND FOR THE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, THE NATIONAL COMMAND CAN AFFORD THE LUXURY OF RIGHTEOUS POLITICAL PNITURING BASED ON BAATHI DOGMA. THIS IN TURN FREQUENTLY LEADS TO TWO OR MORE LEVELS OF POLICY ON THE PART OF THE REGIONAL COMMAND. POLITICAL PURITY IS PRESERVED ON THENORMAL, PUBLIC LEVEL WHILE PRAGMATIC REALITY IS GIVEN MORE WEIGHT AT THE LEVEL OF PRACTICAL EVERY-DAY DECISION MAKING. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THIS CREATES A DIFFICULT WORKING ENVIROMENT FOR THE IRAQI FUNCTIONARIS WHO MUST CARRY OUT THE POLICIES AT THE WORKING LEVEL. A WELL DEVELOPED INSTINCT FOR SURVIVAL IS ESSENTIAL, AND MOST SEASONED IRAQI BUREAUCRATS HAVE MET THE CHALLENGE BY PERFECTING TECHNIQUES OF AVOIDING ANY AND ALL RESPONSIBILITY THAT SHOULD NORMALLY APPERTAIN TO THEIR OFFICE. ALSO NEEDLESS TO SAY, IRAQ'S SPLIT-LEVEL

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POLICIES PRODUCE CONFLICTING SIGNALS THAT CONFUSE AND FRUSTRATE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL FOREIGNERS WHO HAVE DEALINGS WITH THE GOI.

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INFO AMUMBASSY ABU DHABI 0248

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AMEMBASSY JIDDA

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AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1798/2

7. GIVEN THIS CHARACTERISTIC OF IRAQI POLICY MAKING AND  
POLICY EXECUTION, THE MOST LIKELY OUTCOME OF IRAQ'S CURRENT  
POLICY REASSESSMENT IS A CONTINUATION OF THE FORMAL REJECTIONIST  
POSITION IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY THE NATIONAL COMMAND AND IN  
OFFICIAL STATEMENTS TO VIP VISITORS BY GOI OFFICIALS. ON  
THE MORE PRAGMATIC LEVEL, THE GOI WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW A  
WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AND  
TOWARDS ANY OTHER MOVES IN THE DIRECTION OF AN OVERALL  
SETTLEMENT.

8. ON THE USE OF TERRORISM, THE GOI WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE  
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TO EXPRESS ITS OFFICIAL REPUGNANCE AT ANY TERRORISM OUTSIDE  
THE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL PROBABLY  
CONTINUE TO ENCOURGE THE DEVELOPEMENT OF A TERRORISM CAPABILITY  
ON THE PAART OF THE PALESTINIAN EXTREMISTS BASED IN IRAQ.  
TERRORISM WILL NO DOUBT CONTINUE TO BE USED AGAINST THE  
SYRIAN REGIME AND POSSIBLY AGANIST OTHER REGIMES, SUCH AS

THE JORDANIANS, WHO BECAME TOO FRIENDLY WITH SYRIA. TERRORISM MIGHT ALSO BE USED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IF THE IRAQIS DECIDE THAT THE PROBABLE OUTCOME WILL BE TOO BIASED IN FAVOUR OF ISRAEL. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, HOWEVER, THE IRAQIS MIGHT REFRAIN FROM USING THEIR TERRORIST OPTION TO SUPPORT THEIR REJECTIONIST POLICY IF THEY BECOME CONVINCED THAT THE USE OF THIS WEAPON WOULD COST THEM TOO MUCH IN TERMS OF THE POSSIBLE POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL ISOLATION WHICH IT MIGHT BRING IN ITS WAKE. THE IRAQI REGIME WOULD BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED IF THEY BELIEVED THAT THEIR SUPPORT OF TERRORISM COULD JEOPARDIZE THEIR ACCESS TO THE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY THEY NEED FOR THEIR DEVELOPEMENT PROGRAM.

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## Message Attributes

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